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The election must be made with respect to all of the
property in the QTIP trust.7  No partial reverse QTIP
elections may be made.  IRS has indicated that the
regulations will provide, "at a minimum, a form of
transitory relief by permitting post-mortem trust severance
reformations to enable the estate" of an individual "to
conform the QTIP trust to the entire-trust requirement."8
Two-trust planning. For an estate in the $1 million
range, a workable plan might involve creation of  unified
credit trust ($600,000 in amount) in the will or revocable
trust with the balance in a QTIP trust for which an election
is made for the transferor spouse to be treated as the
transferor of the entire QTIP (a reverse QTIP election).
The $1 million exemption of the first spouse to die
would be used with $400,000 allocated to the QTIP and
$600,000 to the unified credit trust.
Three-trust planning.   For estates of substantially
more than $1 million, the will or revocable trust could
create a unified credit trust ($600,000 in amount), a QTIP
trust in the amount of $400,000 for which an election is
made for the transferor spouse to be treated as the transferor
of the entire QTIP (a reverse QTIP election) with the
balance outright to the spouse (or in any other form
qualifying for the marital deduction).
The $1 million exemption of the first spouse to die
would be used with $600,000 allocated to the unified credit
trust and $400,000 allocated to the QTIP.
Income tax deduction.  An income tax deduction is
allowed for the amount of generation skipping transfer tax
imposed on income distributions.9
FOOTNOTES
1 See I.R.C. § 2623.
2 I.R.C. §§ 2621, 2622.
3 See Ltr. Rul. 8944009, July 31, 1989.
4 I.R.C. § 2652(a)(3).  See Ltr. Rul.
9050022, Sept. 14, 1990 (QTIP
election for federal estate tax purposes
and reverse QTIP election for GSTT
purposes); Ltr. Rul. 9101013, Oct. 5 ,
1990 (same).
5 Id.
6 Ltr. Rul. 9125043, no date given.
7 I.R.C. § 2652(a)(3).
8 Ltr. Rul. 9028005, no date given.  See
Ltr. Rul. 9122071, March 6, 1991
(single trust could be divided into two
separate QTIP trusts in conjunction
with reverse QTIP election as to one of
trusts).
9 I.R.C. § 164(a)(5).  See Ann. 91-43,
I.R.B. 1991-11, 29.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKING
LIABILITY.  After the plaintiffs were not paid for
potatoes shipped to a potato broker, the plaintiffs sued the
broker's bank, alleging fraud, constructive trust and violation
of the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA).
The fraud action was based on the assertion that the bank's
previous honoring of checks written by the broker when the
account had insufficient funds was a fraudulent representation
that the broker was solvent and had money in the account.
The court held that the honoring of such checks was not a
representation.  The court also held that the bank account
was not held as a constructive trust in that the account had
no funds to be held and the bank did not use any funds from
the account to offset loans to the broker.  The court also held
that the bank was not an agricultural commodities dealer
subject to PACA.  Val-Land Farms, Inc. v. Third
Nat'l Bank, 937 F.2d 1110 (6th Cir. 1991).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
ESTATE PROPERTY.  Under the debtor's Chapter
13 plan, the debtor's debt for a motor vehicle was reduced to
the fair market value of the vehicle and the creditor would
receive that amount plus 10 percent of the unsecured portion
of the debt.  After confirmation of the plan, the debtor died
and an insurance company paid the creditor the full amount
due on the loan, under the debtor's credit life insurance
policy.  The debtor's estate sought return of the insurance
proceeds in excess of the amount to be paid under the plan.
The court held that the insurance proceeds were estate
property subject to disbursement through the plan.  Matter
of McAteer, 130 B.R. 724 (Bankr. D. N . J .
1991) .
EXEMPTIONS.  The debtor claimed an exemption in
an IRA, an ERISA qualified pension plan, life insurance
policies, annuities and property held with a nondebtor spouse
as tenants by the entireties but subject to several joint debts.
The court held that the IRA was exempt and that ERISA did
not preempt the Florida exemption for interests in ERISA
qualified pension plans.  The court also held that the
entireties property was exempt only to the extent the value
of the debtor's interest in the property exceeded the amount
of the joint claims against the property.  The debtor had
purchased a life insurance policy and an annuity using
exempt and nonexempt assets.  The court held that the
policy and annuity were exempt because the debtor made the
purchases as part of continuing financial planning and not
with the intent to defraud creditors.  In re  Kimmel, 1 3 1
B.R. 223 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991).
JURISDICTION. The debtor was an agricultural
cooperative which had filed a Chapter 7 case. The plaintiffs
were patrons of the cooperative who had purchased supplies
from the cooperative which were stored at the cooperative.
The defendant was a secured creditor of the debtor which had
taken control of the debtor prior to bankruptcy. The plain-
tiffs alleged that the defendant seized the supplies purchased
by the plaintiffs and stored by the defendant and charged addi-
tional amounts for the release of these supplies.  The plain-
tiffs brought suit in a state court alleging conversion, fraud,
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intentional or negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent
transfer. The defendant removed the case to the Bankruptcy
Court and the plaintiffs filed a motion for remand back to the
state court. The court held that it had jurisdiction over the
fraudulent conversion action because the action was a core
proceeding involving estate property. The court also held
that the actions involving conversion were related proceed-
ings and that the court would exercise its discretionary
jurisdiction over these actions because the plaintiffs had also
filed claims for the same amounts against the debtor and
resolution of the conversion actions in favor of the plaintiffs
would bar recovery in the bankruptcy proceeding. The court
remanded the actions for fraud and intentional or negligent
misrepresentations because the actions involved direct
damage from the defendant to the plaintiffs, the result would
not affect the bankruptcy estate, and the action could be
concluded in the state court before final resolution of the
bankruptcy case. In re Fulda Independent Co-op, 130
B.R. 967 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
  CHAPTER 12  
    LIFE INSURANCE. Although a secured creditor had a
security interest in a life insurance policy owned by one of
the debtors, the security interest was not claimed by the
creditor or debtor during the bankruptcy case until after
confirmation of the plan and the death of the insured. The
court held that the lien against the policy was extinguished
by the confirmation of the plan because the lien was not
included in the creditor's secured claim, although the court
noted that the creditor could seek reconsideration of the
secured claim if the creditor could show "cause." The creditor
also argued that the insurance proceeds were not bankruptcy
estate property because the debtor had assigned all interest in
the proceeds to the creditor as security for a loan. The court
held that the insurance proceeds were estate property subject
to the court's jurisdiction and the plan because the debtor
retained at least a contingent interest in the proceeds in that
the assignment was limited by the amount necessary to
cover the loan balance.  In addition, the court held that the
proceeds would be includible in income for purposes of
determining disposable income subject to payment of
unsecured creditors.  The court rejected the creditor's
argument that only federally taxable income was includible
for purposes of determining disposable income.  In re
Martin, 130 B.R. 951 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1991).
PLAN.  On the date the debtors filed for Chapter 12, a
secured claim was listed for a loan which had 10 years
remaining of an original 20 year term.  The plan proposed to
stretch out the loan over 30 years with interest equal to the
rate for 30 year treasury bonds plus 2 percent for risk.  The
creditor objected to the extended term and interest rate,
arguing that the term exceeded both the length of new loans
made by the creditor and the industry practice maximum of
20 years.  The court acknowledged that plan payments over
30 years had been approved in the past but that industry
practice had changed such that agricultural loans were no
longer made beyond 20 years.  Thus, the court fashioned a
compromise allowing the plan payments over 15 years but
amortized at 30 years.  Although the creditor also objected to
a fixed rate of interest as against industry practice, the court
held that the fixed interest rate proposed by the plan was fair.
In re  Koch, 131 B.R. 128 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1991) .
TRUSTEE FEES.  The debtors' plan proposed to pay
all secured creditors outside of the plan without payment of
the trustee's fees.  The court held that all impaired secured
claims were to be paid through the trustee and were subject
to the trustee's fee.  Of the claims not impaired under the
plan, the debtor could make direct payments of claims of
sophisticated lenders who actively participated in the
bankruptcy case, who agreed to direct payments, and who had
the means and motivation to monitor the payments.  The
debtors were required to make payments through the trustee
of claims of unimpaired secured creditors who did not
actively participate in the case and who did not agree to the
direct payments.  In re  Golden, 131 B.R. 2 0 1
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1991).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
AUTOMATIC STAY .  After the debtor filed for
Chapter 13, the IRS filed a garnishment and a notice of tax
lien and attached a refund of the debtor, although the IRS had
received several written and oral notices of the bankruptcy
case.  The court held that the action violated the automatic
stay and awarded the debtor compensatory damages, attorney
fees and $3,525 in punitive damages.  In re  Davis, 1 3 1
B.R. 50 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991).
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS .  The IRS served a
notice of levy on the debtors wages more than 90 days before
the debtor's filing for bankruptcy and amounts were deducted
from the debtors wages during the 90 days before filing
bankruptcy.  The debtor moved to have the levied wages
returned to the bankruptcy estate as avoidable preferential
transfers.  The IRS argued that it was immune from such
actions and that the "transfer" occurred when the levy was
noticed and not when the wages were deducted.  The court
held that the government had waived immunity under
Section 106 and that the levies of the wages were transfers
for purposes of the preferential transfer rules.  The issue of
avoidability of the transfers was left for determination after
an evidentiary hearing.  In re  Ballard, 131 B.R. 9 7
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1991).
DISMISSAL.  Under incorrect legal advice, the debtor
filed a Chapter 7 case believing that the debtor's tax liabili-
ties were not dischargeable.  The debtor sought dismissal of
the case when the debtor learned that if the case was filed a
short time later, the taxes would have been dischargeable.
The appellate court upheld the bankruptcy court's refusal to
dismiss the case because the debtor failed to demonstrate that
no legal prejudice would result from the dismissal, in that
the IRS would have been legally prejudiced by having the
taxes become nondischargeable as a result of a dismissal and
refiling.  In re  Leach, 130 B.R. 855 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1991).
ESTIMATED TAXES .  Prior to filing for
bankruptcy, the debtors filed their 1987 income tax return
and elected to apply the refund to the 1988 estimated tax
payments.  The debtors filed for bankruptcy in 1988 and had
sufficient funds withheld or paid to meet the 1988 tax
liability and in 1989 the IRS refunded the excess from 1987.
The trustee sought turnover of the refund from the IRS but
the IRS paid the refund to the debtors anyway.  The court
held that the refund was attributable to the prebankruptcy
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period and was estate property and ordered the IRS to pay the
same amount to the trustee.  In re  Canon, 130 B . R .
748 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991).
INTEREST AND PENALTIES.  The debtors had
filed a previous Chapter 13 case and under the plan paid
amounts for federal income and withholding taxes.
Although the payments were made to satisfy taxes for 1983
and 1981, the amounts paid were applied to taxes owed for
1976 through 1980.  When the debtors filed the current
Chapter 13 case, the IRS filed a claim for the 1983 and 1981
taxes plus interest and penalties.  The court held that the
interest and penalties were allowed claims.  In re Putnam,
131 B.R. 52 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991).
PRIORITY.  The debtor entered into a cash collateral
agreement with the IRS to substitute other collateral to
secure a tax lien.  The IRS argued that the agreement
extinguished the tax lien and created an ordinary lien not
subject to the priority rules of Section 724.  The court held
that Section 724 applied to liens securing claims for taxes,
including the substitute lien granted in the cash collateral
agreement. The court also held that the IRS claim was not
entitled to Section 507(b) priority because the value of the
tax lien was not diminished because of the automatic stay,
but because of the Section 724 priority. In re  Life
Imaging Corp., 131 B.R. 174 (Bankr. D. C o l o .
1991) .
TAX LIENS.  The IRS had perfected a tax lien against
the debtors' property prior to the debtors' filing for
bankruptcy.  The debtors' personal liability for the underly-
ing taxes was discharged in the bankruptcy case but the lien
was not avoided and the IRS levied against the debtors'
insurance policy after the bankruptcy case was closed.  The
debtors argued that the lien was not perfected because actual
notice was not given to the insurance company as required
by I.R.C. § 6323(b)(9)(A).  The court held that the actual
notice requirement was available as a defense only by the
insurance company and that the lien was valid as against the
debtors upon assessment of the taxes.  The court also held
that the lien survived the bankruptcy discharge and was
enforceable against the debtors' property.  Finally, the court
held that the amount of property subject to the lien was the
cash value of the policy on the date of bankruptcy filing and
that any additions made post-petition by the debtors were not
subject to the lien.  In re  Hanson, 91-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,485 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991).
COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING
FUTURES COMMISSION MERCHANT.  The
plaintiffs were sweet corn growers who entered into variable
price sweet corn growing contracts with the defendant with
the contract price determined by reference to field corn prices.
The contracts provided for partial payment in October after
harvest and the following June.  In order to hedge the effect
of significantly changing prices during the terms of the con-
tracts, the defendant purchased field corn futures contracts.
When the price of field corn dropped, the growers received
more in their October payments than they were entitled to
under the whole contracts and the defendant sought repay-
ment of a portion of the October payments.  The growers
sought to prohibit the charges by filing suit against the
defendant, alleging that the defendant violated the Commod-
ity Exchange Act (CEA) as a nonregistered futures commis-
sion merchant (FCM).  The court held that the CEA did not
provide a private right of enforcement and that in any case,
the defendant was not an FCM because the defendant pur-
chased commodity futures only for its own use.  Marshall
v. Green Giant Co., 942 F.2d 539 (8th Cir .
1991) .
FEDERAL
AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CONSERVATION.  The plaintiff owned farmland in
the federal New Jersey Pinelands Reserve area and wanted to
sell the land in ten acre parcels for residential farmettes.
Under the federal program, the New Jersey Pinelands
Commission had established a comprehensive management
plan (CMP) for the reserve area restricting the sale of land to
a minimum of 40 acres with a maximum of one acre which
could be used for a residence and the rest devoted to
agricultural use.  The plaintiff argued that the restrictions
were an unconstitutional taking of property without
compensation.  The court found that the restrictions were
part of a valid governmental purpose of protecting the
environment, preserving agriculture and regulating land use.
The court held that the restrictions were not an unconstitu-
tional taking because the plaintiff still maintained the
present use of the land, could obtain compensation for
voluntarily including restrictions on the property and was
not restricted any more than similar property in the area.
Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm'n, 5 9 3
A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991).
PERISHABLE AGRIC. COMMODITIES ACT .
The plaintiff corporation was a fruit and vegetable brokerage,
a licensee under PACA, which had failed to make prompt
payment on 51 orders of produce. The failure of the company
from an economic downturn in the produce industry
prevented the company from making the payments and the
company voluntarily gave up its license. The owner of the
company admitted to being a person responsibly connected
with the company and the ALJ had found that the failures to
pay were frequent and flagrant violations of the PACA. In an
attempt to mitigate the consequences of the violations, the
ALJ backdated the publishing of the findings so that the
owner could retain employment with another PACA
licensee. The JO reversed the ALJ's decision to backdate the
order. The court held that it had no authority to change the
JO's order because the PACA mandated the sanctions and the
effect on the owner was not a consideration in determinations
involving sanctions against the company. Farley &
Calfee v. Dept. of Agric., 941 F.2d 964 (9th
Cir. 1991).
PESTICIDES.  The city of Boulder, Colorado enacted
two pesticide ordinances, one provided for local enforcement
of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act and
Colorado pesticide laws and the other imposed local notifica-
tion requirements.  The court held that, under Wisconsin
Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S.Ct. 2476 (1991), the
first ordinance was preempted by FIFRA but the second
ordinance was not.  Coparr, Ltd. v. City of Boulder,
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942 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1991), aff'g , 735 F .
Supp. 363 (D. Colo. 1989).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
ANNUAL EXCLUSION.  The decedent established
an irrevocable trust for three children with remainders to the
beneficiaries' issue.  The beneficiaries had a limited testa-
mentary power of appointment over trust corpus.  Within
the last 20 days of December of each year, the primary bene-
ficiaries and their issue all had the power to withdraw a pro
rata share of contributions to the trust during the year.  The
decedent had filed gift tax returns for each year contributions
were made to the trust and claimed the annual exclusion
amount for each beneficiary and their issue.  The IRS ruled
that the annual exclusions were not allowed for the remainder
holders because no withdrawals were made or intended.  Ltr.
Rul. 9141008, June 24, 1991.
APPORTIONMENT OF ESTATE TAX . Under
the decedent's will, the estate taxes were to be treated as any
other debts of the estate and paid without recovery by any
legatee. The IRS ruled that the estate taxes were to be
apportioned among the residuary legatees, thus decreasing the
amount passing to the surviving spouse and eligible for the
marital deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9140005, June 2 5 ,
1991 .
COMMUNITY PROPERTY. The decedent and sur-
viving spouse had executed a pre-nuptial agreement stating
that the parties renounced their right to include post-marriage
property in community property. The decedent's executrix
challenged the agreement but the agreement was upheld by
the state trial and appellate courts. The Tax Court deferred to
the state court decisions and held that the agreement was
valid and the property held by the decedent at death was
separate property included in the gross estate.  Est. o f
Haydel v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-507.
DISCLAIMER.  The surviving spouse disclaimed
$400,000 of the decedent spouse's interest in a joint bank
account which would have passed to the spouse under the
decedent's will.  The IRS ruled that the disclaimer, made
within nine months after the decedent's death, was effective.
Ltr. Rul. 9140005, June 25, 1991.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX.
The decedent had established a revocable trust which was last
amended in December 1981.  At the decedent's death, on
December 1, 1986, the trust was divided into three trusts, a
marital deduction trust, a residuary trust which was not
funded, and a QTIP trust eligible for the marital deduction.
The surviving spouse had a limited testamentary power of
appointment over the QTIP trust and intended to exercise
that power in a will for surviving children and their issue,
including additional powers of appointment for each
beneficiary.  The IRS ruled that the revocable trust and
testamentary trusts created by the decedent were not subject
to GSTT.  Ltr. Rul. 9141015, July 9, 1991.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.  In an audit of the
decedent's estate tax return the IRS revalued for estate tax
purposes gifts made more than three years before.  The estate
argued that the gift tax statute of limitations barred the
revaluation but the court held that the  gift tax statute of
limitations did not apply to the valuation of gifts for estate
tax purposes.  Stalcup v. U.S., 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas .
(CCH) ¶ 60,086 (W.D. Okla. 1991).
  The decedent established an irrevocable trust for three
children with remainders to the beneficiaries' issue.  The
decedent had filed gift tax returns for each year contributions
were made to the trust and claimed the annual exclusion
amount for each beneficiary and their issue.  The statute of
limitations on the gifts had run for three of the four years of
the trust.  The IRS ruled that the most of the annual
exclusions were not allowed and ruled that the adjusted
taxable gifts could be redetermined for estate tax purposes
even though the gift tax statute of limitations had run.  The
IRS also ruled that the gift taxes payable would be
redetermined to reflect the gift tax which would have been
payable if the gifts were properly reported, taking into
account the unified credit available to the decedent at the time
the gifts were made.  Ltr. Rul. 9141008, June 2 4 ,
1991 .
   TRANSFERS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF
DEATH.  The decedent and spouse established a revocable
trust funded with stock and with the decedent and spouse as
initial trustees and as sole income beneficiaries.  The trusts
made no provision for distribution of corpus to the beneficia-
ries.  The trustees had the power to revoke part of all of the
trust, in which case the property reverted back to the decedent
and spouse as community property.  The trustees requested
the corporation to transfer stock held in the trust to several
family members.  The trust was then amended to substitute
the decedent's children as trustees.  In the following taxable
year, the new trustees requested the corporation to transfer
stock to several members of the decedent's family.  The
decedent died within three years of both transfers.  The IRS
ruled that the transfers would be treated as revocations of
portions of the trust and distributions of the stock to the
decedent and spouse with further transfer to the donees.
Thus, the stock transferred was not included in the decedent's
gross estate.  Ltr. Rul. 9141005, July 5, 1991.
As an employee of a corporation, the decedent was
insured under a group life insurance plan which terminated
upon the decedent's retirement, with the right of the decedent
to convert the policy to an individual policy without a
medical examination.  The decedent exercised that right upon
retirement but had the "new" policy owned by a trust
established by the decedent's children.  The decedent died
within three years after the conversion of the policy.  The
estate argued that the "new" policy was a separate policy in
which the decedent had no ownership interest and the
proceeds of the policy were not included in the decedent's
estate.  The IRS ruled, however, that the "new" policy was
substantially a continuation of the group life insurance
policy in which the decedent did have an ownership interest,
exercised by having the "new" policy transferred to the trust.
Thus, the proceeds of the policy were included in the
decedent's gross estate.  Ltr. Rul. 9141007, June 1 9 ,
1991 .
    TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS.
The decedent established a trust in 1930 with the decedent as
life income beneficiary, with the remainder to the decedent's
spouse. The decedent's spouse was co-trustee with a
corporate co-trustee.  The decedent retained the right to
modify or revoke the trust with the consent of the spouse.
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The IRS ruled that the trust was revocable because, under the
law at the time of creation of the trust, the spouse's consent
to revocation or modification of the trust was not adverse.
Ltr. Rul. 9140003, June 19, 1991.
TRUSTS . A funeral home provided prearranged funeral
contracts under which the funeral home deposited the pur-
chaser's funds into a trust account with a financial institution
as trustee.  The purchase agreement could make the trust
revocable or irrevocable.  The IRS ruled that in both cases,
the trusts were grantor trusts with income taxable to the
purchaser.  Ltr. Rul. 9140006, June 25, 1991.
In another similar ruling, the IRS also held that income
from the trust which was paid to the funeral home was
payment for merchandise or services and included in the
funeral home's income.  Ltr. Rul. 9141040, July 1 6 ,
1991 .
The taxpayer established an irrevocable trust for the
taxpayer's spouse and children.  The beneficiaries had the
power to withdraw current contributions up to the annual
exclusion amount.  The spouse had a lifetime and
testamentary limited power to appoint trust principal.  The
spouse had included in a will a provision for appointment of
the trust corpus to a trust for the taxpayer and a trust for the
children.  The IRS ruled that the taxpayer would be treated as
the owner of the irrevocable trust, transfers of property to the
trusts were completed gifts and the trust property would be
included in the taxpayer's gross estate.  The IRS also ruled
that the trust property would not be included in the spouse's
gross estate.  Ltr. Rul. 9141027, July 11, 1991.
VALUATION.  Under a predeceased spouse's will, the
decedent had received a QTIP interest in the predeceased
spouse's community property interest in real property.  At
the date of death, the decedent owned the QTIP interest, the
decedent's community property interest in the property and a
separate undivided interest in fee in the property.  All of this
property was included in the decedent's gross estate and the
IRS ruled that all of the property interests would be
aggregated for purposes of valuing the decedent's interest in
the real property; thus, the decedent's estate was not entitled
to a minority discount as to any particular ownership interest
in the property held by the decedent.  Ltr. R u l .
9140002, June 18, 1991.
The stock of a corporation was held entirely by members
of one family, either outright, in trust or by custodians for
minors.  Under the corporation's articles of incorporation in
effect prior to October 9, 1990, the stock buying and selling
was restricted such that ownership was restricted to the cor-
poration or family members.  The corporation amended its
articles to split each share of stock into 100 shares, with the
resulting value of each shareholder's total stock remaining
the same.  The articles were also amended to conform the
liability of directors to state law and were amended to
increase the maximum number of directors allowed.  The
IRS ruled that the amendments did not substantially modify
the restriction created prior to October 9, 1990 sufficient to
subject the stock to the valuation rules of I.R.C. § 2703.
Ltr. Rul. 9141043, July 16, 1991.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS.  The taxpayer was
denied deductions for pre-opening expenses, depreciation and
other business operating expenses for a hunting lodge where
the taxpayer failed to show that the taxpayer actively engaged
in operating the lodge as a business for the production of
income.  Est. of Miller v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1991-515 .
COMMODITY STRADDLES.  The taxpayer was a
commodities dealer who entered into commodities straddles
in 1976 and 1977 with no intention of making a profit.  The
taxpayer argued that Section 1808(d) of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986 allowed commodities dealers to claim a loss from
the sale of the first "leg" of the straddle whether or not the
straddle was entered into for profit.  Section 1808(d) provided
that losses incurred by dealers were considered losses incurred
in a trade or business and such losses were deductible.  The
court held that Section 1808(d) still required that a loss be
suffered; thus, if a straddle had no economic effect, no loss
could be suffered and Section 1808(d) did not apply.  Because
the taxpayer's straddle purchases were economic shams, the
taxpayer had no economic losses to support loss deductions.
Cook v. Comm'r, 941 F.2d 734 (9th Cir. 1991) ,
aff'g , 90 T.C. 975 (1988).
COOPERATIVES.  A corporation amended its by-
laws to require that all shareholders be producers who process
their products through the corporation.  The bylaws also
allowed each shareholder one share of stock and one vote.
The net profit/loss of the corporation was to be allocated
according to each shareholder's share of production delivered
to the corporation, with losses recouped by direct assess-
ments.  The IRS ruled that the corporation operated on a
cooperative basis for purposes of Subchapter T with net
income allocated qualifying as patronage dividends.  The IRS
refused to rule on the issue of deductibility of direct assess-
ments because the deductibility depended upon particular
facts and circumstances of the shareholders.  Ltr. R u l .
9141028, July 11, 1991.
EMPLOYMENT TAXES .  The IRS has announced
that overpayments in a completed tax period may be credited
to a succeeding period if the taxpayer so elects, or the
taxpayer may file for a refund.  Rev. Proc. 91 -52 ,
I.R.B. 1991-35, 10, clarifying Rev. Proc. 90-52,
1990-2 C.B. 642.
FAMILY ESTATE TRUSTS.  The taxpayers trans-
ferred a veterinary practice and cattle business to a trust with
the taxpayer and spouse as beneficiaries and trustees. The
court held that the trust had no economic substance and all
trust income was chargeable to the taxpayers, where the tax-
payer retained control over all assets and performed no trustee
duties.Paulson v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-508.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT. The stipulated facts
presented by the taxpayers, in the initial case, demonstrated
that the leases of computer equipment by the taxpayers to a
corporation controlled by them were for one year but were
renewed each year.  The Tax Court held that the burden was
on the IRS to prove that the leases were intended to continue
beyond half of the six year useful life of the computers and
allowed the investment tax credit based on the stipulated
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facts. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and re-
manded the Tax Court opinion to provide grounds for its
decision allowing investment tax credit.  On remand, the Tax
Court held that the IRS had met its burden by raising several
issues that were not resolved in the stipulated facts--(1) why
were the computers not sold to the corporation, (2) what was
the business purpose for the one year leases, and (3) what
other leases did the taxpayers have with third parties?
Because the stipulated facts did not resolve these issues,
summary judgment was awarded to the IRS.  The appellate
court affirmed.  Borchers v. Comm'r, 943 F.2d 2 2
(8th Cir. 1991), aff'g , 95 T.C. 82 (1990), o n
rem. from  889 F.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1989), rev'g
and rem'g T.C. Memo. 1988-349.
PARTNERSHIPS
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS.  A partnership
with less than 10 partners who were all individuals was
excepted from the partnership audit procedures and the IRS
was not required to issue a final partnership administrative
adjustment before the Tax Court would have jurisdiction
over a deficiency determination involving a partnership loss
claimed by a partner.  McKnight v. Comm'r, T . C .
Memo. 1991-514.
PENALTIES.  The taxpayers were assessed for tax
deficiencies for tax years 1982 through 1984 but had not
been assessed the penalty for substantial underpayment of tax
which was increased from 10 to 25 percent by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.  After passage of the Act, the IRS
assessed the 25 percent penalty and the taxpayers argued that
the retroactive application of the increase was unconstitu-
tional.  The court upheld the retroactive assessment of the
penalty in cases where the penalty had not been assessed as
of the effective date of the 1986 Act.  Licari v. Comm'r,
91-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,494 (9th Cir .
1991), aff'g , T.C. Memo. 1990-4.
RETIREMENT PLANS .  The IRS has announced
that new regulations, Treas. Reg. § 54.4979-1, have changed
the due date, to the last day of the 15th month after the close
of the plan year, for the payment of excise tax on excess
contributions to plans with cash or deferred arrangements.
Ann. 91-150, I.R.B. 1991-41, 55.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
NOVEMBER 1991
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.89 5.81 5.77 5.74
110% AFR 6.49 6.39 6.34 6.31
120% AFR 7.09 6.97 6.91 6.87
Mid-term
AFR 7.22 7.09 7.03 6.99
110% AFR 7.95 7.80 7.73 7.68
120% AFR 8.69 8.51 8.42 8.36
Long-term
AFR 7.84 7.69 7.62 7.57
110% AFR 8.64 8.46 8.37 8.31
120% AFR 9.44 9.23 9.13 9.06
SELF-EMPLOYMENT.  The taxpayer made contri-
butions to a Keogh account and claimed the contributions as
a business expense in calculating self-employment income
subject to social security taxes.  The court held that the
contributions were not deductible from self-employment
income because the contributions were not deductible as
business expenses.  Gale v. U.S., 768 F. Supp.
1305 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
SOCIAL SECURITY TAX .  Beginning with the
January 3, 1991 payment, the monthly social security
benefit payments will increase 3.7 percent.  The maximum
amount of annual wages subject to Old Age Survivors and
Disability Insurance for 1992 is $55,500, with a maximum
of $130,300 subject to the medicare portion of the tax.  The
maximum amount of annual earnings before reduction of
benefits is $10,200 for persons aged 65 through 69 and
$7,440 for persons under age 65.  HHS News Release,
October 17, 1991.
TAX LIENS.  In 1980, the articles of incorporation of
a farm corporation owned by the taxpayers were forfeited by
the state for failure to pay state franchise taxes.  In 1985 the
IRS assessed taxes against the corporation and filed notice of
tax liens against the corporation's farmland.  The IRS
attempted a levy against the proceeds of a governmental
easement by condemnation over some of the farmland.  The
taxpayers argued that the levy was improper because the land
did not belong to the corporation after three years after the
forfeiture of the articles of incorporation.  The court held that
although the corporation could no longer sue or be sued after
three years after the forfeiture, the title to the land remained
with the corporation because no conveyance had been made
to the taxpayers as individuals.  Pottorf v. U.S., 91 -2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,487 (D. Kan. 1991).
MORTGAGES
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.  The debtors had
defaulted on a loan from the plaintiff in 1986 and the
plaintiff sought foreclosure in 1988.  The trial court disal-
lowed prejudgment interest from the time of the default to
the date of the foreclosure because, because the debtors had
made several attempts over that time to satisfy the loan by
deeding the property to the plaintiff or restructuring the loan.
The appellate court reversed and held that prejudgment
interest should be allowed because the debtors were as
responsible as the plaintiff for the delays in restructuring the
loan.  Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Tucker,
813 P.2d 619 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
SALE.  After the plaintiffs defaulted on a loan from the
defendant, the defendant obtained a foreclosure judgment and
purchased the collateral, several separate parcels of land, as
one unit at the foreclosure sale.  The defendant then sold the
parcels individually.  The plaintiffs objected to the form of
the sale, arguing that the single foreclosure sale of the
parcels prevented the land from obtaining the best price and
prevented the plaintiffs from buying or redeeming some of
the parcels.  The trial court had dismissed the plaintiffs'
petition, which the appellate court treated as a summary
judgment.  The court held that the plaintiffs had
demonstrated that there could be facts showing that the
single sale of the separate parcels resulted in injury to the
plaintiffs' rights but that the foreclosure sale could not be
avoided if the trial court found that the current owners were
bona fide purchasers.  The appellate court acknowledged that
the trial court had equitable powers to formulate other
equitable remedies.  Garris v. Federal Land Bank o f
Jackson, 584 So.2d 791 (Ala. 1991).
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SECURED
TRANSACTIONS
AUCTIONEERS.  The debtor had granted the bank a
security interest in all livestock in January 1986.  From
January 1986 through January 1987, the defendant, a live-
stock market agency, sold hogs belonging to the debtor and
subject to the security interest and remitted the proceeds to
the debtor.  On February 7, 1986, the bank was declared
insolvent and the FDIC was appointed as receiver.  On May
5, 1986, the FDIC sent notice to the debtor not to sell any
collateral without prior written approval.  On July 7, 1986,
the FDIC sent notice to the defendant of the security interest
in the debtor's hogs.  The FDIC sued the defendant for the
proceeds of the sales of the debtor's hogs made by the
defendant from January 1986 through January 1987.  The
court held that the bank had waived its security interest in
the hogs for the period from the granting of the security
interest until the bank was declared insolvent because of the
bank's course of dealing with the debtor in not requiring
consent to sell the collateral prior to sales.  The trial court
held that upon the takeover of the bank by the FDIC, the
FDIC had not agreed to the bank's waiver of the debtor's
security interest because none of the factors under 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e) were met by the waiver; thus, the security
interest remained valid from the date of the FDIC takeover
until December 23, 1986.  The appellate court reversed on
this issue, holding that state law applied, and under Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 9-307(1), (4), (7) in effect at the time, the
defendant had posted the notice required by Section 9-307(7)
and was, therefore, able to sell the debtor's hogs free of the
security interest.   On December 23, 1986, the date
Nebraska established a central filing system under the federal
farm products rule, the FDIC was required to file its security
interest with the secretary of state, which it failed to do.
Therefore, from December 23, 1986 through February 1987,
the defendant was not liable for the proceeds of the sales of
the collateral.  FDIC v. Bowles Livestock Comm'n
Co., 937 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir. 1991), rev'g and
rem'g , 739 F. Supp. 1364 (D. Neb. 1990).
STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL USE .  The plaintiff purchased
two acres of unimproved land which were part of a larger
tract assessed as open land.  The plaintiff filed for
continuation of the open land classification of the two acres.
The trial court upheld the denial of the application, holding
that the two acres did not meet any of the qualifications for
the open land classification.  The appellate court reversed
and held that the plaintiff's expert witness provided
sufficient evidence that the land qualified as open land, under
R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-27-2(c), because the land was in a 100
year flood plain and was within a saltwater marsh coastline
area.  Denault v. Fitzgerald, 593 A.2d 453 (R.I .
1991) .
CITATION UPDATES
In re  Fernandez, 130 B.R. 757 (W.D. Mich.
1991) (responsible person) see p. 182 supra.
Est. of Johnson v. U.S., 941 F.2d 1318 (5th
Cir. 1991), rev'g , 742 F. Supp. 940 ( S . D .
Miss. 1990) (charitable deduction) see p. 180 supra.
In re  Rasbury, 130 B.R. 990 (Bankr. N . D .
Ala. 1991) (withholding taxes) see p. 183 supra.
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